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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
they might "further find'' presupposes that they have already
found, and it is not unreasonable to say that the jury thereby
could be misled into returning an unqualified verdict, though all
twelve had not agreed to do so.
T. E. M.
FEDERAL COURTS - VENUE - "RESIDENCE" OF DEFENDANT IN
FEDERAL RESERVATION GROUNDED ON STATE LAWS CONCERNING AD-
MISSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. - Plaintiff, a Massachusetts
citizen, sued defendant Delaware corporation in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to recover for in-
juries received from a fire in defendant's hotel on the Fort Monroe
Military Reservation located in that part of Virginia included in
the eastern district. Service was pursuant to a Virginia statute,
VA. CODE (Supp. 1946) § 3846a, providing that foreign corpora-
tions doing business in Virginia should be deemed to have ap-
pointed the Secretary of the Commonwealth as agent to receive
service of process. The act of cession of the reservation from Vir-
ginia to the United States reserved the right of the state officers
to serve process therein. Defendant, who did no business in Vir-
ginia except that on the reservation, made timely objection to the
venue. After judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed on the
ground of want of personal jurisdiction. Held, that under state
statutes requiring consent by foreign corporations to constructive
service as a condition of entering to do business within the state,
a foreign corporation doing its only business in that state on a
federal reservation is suable in the locally appropriate federal
court on causes of action arising from the business done provided
the act of cession from the state to the federal government reserves
the right of state officers to serve process in the reservation. Af-
firmed. Knott Corp. v. Furman, 16.1 F. 2d 199 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
The federal venue statute indicates the district of residence of
either plaintiff or defendant as the only proper venue when fed-
eral jurisdiction is based exclusively on diversity of citizenship.
49 STAT. 1213 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (Supp. 1947). However,
in Neirbo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939), designa-
tion of an agent to receive service of process in conformity with a
valid state statute as a condition of doing business within the state
was held an effective consent to be sued in the federal courts as
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well as the courts of that state. The principal case, where consent
was not express but implied by the statute from the corporation's
doing business in the state, extends that doctrine. A more serious
question arises from the application of the Virginia venue statute
to a defendant whose only business was on the federal reservation.
Such statutes, challenged in the courts, have been upheld as a con-
stitutional exercise of the state's power to exclude foreign corpora-
tions, except those desiring to carry on an exclusive interstate com-
merce business, or to place such terms on their admission as will
protect the interest of the state and its citizens. 17 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (1933) § 8456. Had Virginia then
such power of exclusion or regulation as to one doing no business
in Virginia outside the reservation? The Constitution gives Con-
gress the power of exclusive legislation in areas ceded to the United
States for military purposes. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8. If Congress
had exclusive power to regulate defendant's entry, the power of
exclusion and regulation upon which application of Virginia's
venue statute is ordinarily predicated would seem to be lacking.
'While state laws in force at the time of cession are presumably
adopted as the law of the ceded area until changed by Congress,
James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94 (1940), and reser-
vations and conditions not inconsistent with the purposes of the
acquisition may be attached by the state in the act of cession,
United States v. Unzetta, 281 U. S..538 (1930), the act of cession
of the Fort Monroe Military Reservation was passed in 1821 be-
fore the problem of bringing foreign corporations into court was
articulated. Va. Acts 1821, c. 73. The act did provide that state
officials might execute process and discharge their legal functions
in the reservation, which the principal case construes to mean that
state process laws both existing and as amended would apply in
the reservation; so that such statutes as the one here involved are
incorporated in the law of the reservation with the same legal
consequences in the reservation as in the state at large. This inter-
pretation, although fairly liberal, is not obviously opposed to the
intent of the act of cession. But a legal hiatus still remains in as-
suming the application of the statute, the terms of which do not
suggest a construction allowing Virginia power to exclude or con-
dition defendant's entry to do business in the reservation, the tra-
ditional justification for constructive appointment of a state of-
ficial to receive service of process. Without such power the state
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1949], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol51/iss3/8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
has nothing to confer in exchange for defendant's consent to serv-
ice. Unless defendant is suable in the state courts the Neirbo
doctrine does not apply nor support venue in the federal courts.
-lad defendant corporation done business elsewhere in the body
of the state outside the military reservation or had the act of ces-
sion expressly reserved to the state authority to regulate entry of
foreign corporations to do business therein, other issues would be
presented: and of course the principal case is not authority that
doing business on a federal reservation invokes the state statutes
on venue and constructive appointment for service regardless of
the terms of the act of cession. What is involved is the proper
construction and operation of a conventional reservation of juris-
diction clause.
D. B. H.
TAXATION - INCOME TAXES - NEGLIGENCE PENALTY. - The
Internal Revenue Commissioner assessed a five per cent negligence
penalty on a deficiency resulting from taxpayer's failure to report
as his income dividends on stock in form sold to his son and on a
deficiency resulting from omission of two items from 1941 income.
The taxpayer contested the treatment of the dividends as his in-
come and asserted that he was not aware of a duty to report the
two items as income in 1941. The tax court upheld the assess-
ment of deficiencies and the penalty and taxpayer appealed. Held,
assessments sustained. Assessment of the negligence penalty is an
administrative act depending upon a finding of the existence of
negligence, and taxpayer could easily have obtained advice as to
the proper course to be pursued. Gouldman v. Commissioner, 165
F. 2d 686 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
INT. REV. CODE 293 (a) (1) provides: "If any part of any
deficiency is due to negligence. . . 5 per centum of the total
amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be
assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as if it were a
deficiency . . . ." The holding in the principal case is in accord
with settled judicial treatment of this provision of the statute.
Board v. Commissioner, 55 F. 2d 73 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), cert.
denied 284 U. S. 658 (1931); Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d
35 (C. C. A. 10th 1935); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 44
F. Supp. 417 (E. D. Wash. 1942). In ascertaining whether tax-
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